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The Benefi ts of a Better Education System:








Previous cross-country analyses of the factors that affect education outcomes have 
focused on measures of school inputs such as average pupil-teacher ratios, teacher 
characteristics, and availability of learning materials. The capacity of the education 
system to translate these inputs into education outcomes has not been researched 
in the same way because internationally comparable measures of the quality of the 
system have not been available. Assessing the quality of an education system is 
an immense task, but efforts have been made to construct a unique database with 
information on the quality of the education system in a large number of countries. 
This paper uses that database to examine how indicators of system quality are 
associated with measures of learning that are approximately comparable across 
countries, as well as with average years of schooling and people’s view of their 
education system. The paper estimates these relationship controlling for the level 
of educaton expenditure and per-capita GDP across countries. Although measures 
of the quality of the education system can be improved signifi cantly, the fi ndings 
indicate that better education systems do yield better education outcomes. (181)
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1 Data are from OECD (2015).
2 At the same time, it is possible for countries such as Papua New Guinea and Swaziland to do well 
on international tests because only a small majority of their population enter or stay in school long 
enough to participate in international tests.
Data sources: Barro-Lee (latest year) data on estimated average years of completed schooling for 
population ages 25 and over (Barro & Lee, 2013); and harmonized test scores from international 
assessments (Altinok et al., 2013).
Figure 1. Country-level average student achievement scores and average years of 
completed schooling
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Introduction: Why a Systems Approach to Education Reform
In the last several years, there has been increased interest in exploring not only how 
educational inputs but also how the quality of the education system can improve education 
outcomes. This interest has grown because of widespread concerns that school systems 
are falling behind the times and that young job seekers may not be prepared for the 
labor markets that await them. More cross-country evidence on student learning is now 
available, revealing that, despite increasing school enrollment and completion rates across 
the globe, significant numbers of students do not achieve minimum levels of reading 
comprehension and math skills. Regional and international student assessments show 
huge differences across countries as well as within countries. And, as Figure 1 shows, 
the average completed years of schooling across countries, while generally positively 
associated with average student performance on multinational assessments (correlation 
coeffi cient of 0.66),1 have not ensured correspondingly higher student achievement. For 
example, while the average completed schooling in South Africa is 9.4 years (that is, at 
about the 40th percentile), its average student performance is lower than in any other 
country.2 
3 The study outlines four stages of improvement (Mourshed et al., 2010): In the poor to fair stage, 
system leaders must choose the set of interventions that support students by providing scaffolding 
for low-skilled teachers, fulfi lling basic student needs, and bringing all the schools up to a minimum 
quality threshold. In the fair to good stage, the interventions must focus on consolidating the system 
foundations through high quality performance data, ensuring teacher and school accountability, and 
creating appropriate fi nancing, organization structure, and pedagogy models. In the good to great 
stage, the interventions must focus on professionalizing the teaching force and school leadership, 
putting in place clearly defi ned career paths. Finally, in the great to excellent stage, the interventions 
must move the locus of improvement from the center to the schools themselves through peer-based 
learning, system-wide interaction, and support for innovation and experimentation.
The Benefi ts of a Better Education System: What Cross-Country Data Can Tell Us
－ 109 －
The challenge is how to improve education systems so that they deliver good 
learning outcomes for all students. This is not an easy challenge. Education systems are 
complex organizations, consisting of teachers, school leaders and administrators, and 
students—from pre-schooling to tertiary education. Behind the frontline deliverers of 
instruction and learning are national and local education agencies that set and implement 
policies and priorities, allocate budgets, and oversee the schools. The schools (and 
universities, vocational or technical training programs) include not only state-owned 
institutions, but also non-state institutions that are owned and operated by the private 
enterprise sector, faith-based organizations, or private, non-profit organizations and 
individuals. Further, either as units within the education ministry or as private contractors, 
there are publishers of textbooks and learning materials, maintenance staff of schools, 
providers of transport or school meals, and so on.  
In addition, an education system consists of the accountability relationships that 
connect these diverse actors and units; the standards for developing curricula across 
education levels; employment contracts, compensation packages and career paths of the 
education workforce; fi nancing and information mechanisms that keep schools operating; 
and so on. When these standards, rules, accountability relationships and financing 
levels are aligned towards achieving shared education goals, the system—despite its 
complexity and size—is able to perform well. The top education systems in the world are 
not necessarily the best-fi nanced systems, but those systems that manage their fi nancial 
resources and talent well towards clear objectives. In contrast, weak education systems 
struggle to achieve that alignment and coherence. Their goals, standards, and rules are not 
clearly defi ned; resources are not used effi ciently; information about inputs and outcomes 
are absent or incomplete; and accountability mechanisms are inadequate.
There have been efforts to assess the quality of education systems and what it takes 
to improve them. A McKinsey study assessed 20 national and city education systems 
and used their experience to defi ne an improvement path from low performance to better 
performance (Mourshed et al., 2010). The study listed six elements that are needed to 
transform an education system: revising curriculum and standards, ensuring an appropriate 
reward and remunerations structure for teachers and principals, building the technical skills 
of teachers and principals, assessing students, establishing data systems, and facilitating 
improvement through the introduction of policy documents and education laws.3 
4 A description of the 6-year RISE program is in its website: http://www.opml.co.uk/projects/rise-
improving-education-systems-low-income-countries-0. 
5 The OECD Teaching and Learning International Study (TALIS) provides comparable data on 
teacher quality across countries; this database has been used mostly for analyses on more advanced 
countries (Ben et al., 2012). 
6 See Bruns, Filmer, & Patrinos (2011) for a review of this literature.
7 See Ferraz, Finan, & Moreira (2012) on Brazil, for example. The study uses measures of 
corruption involving educational block grants transferred from the central government to 
municipalities. 
8 See Ashley et al. (2014) and James (1993). 
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These fundamentals correspond roughly to Pritchett’s (2015) conceptual framework 
for the Research on Improving Systems of Education (or RISE) program which defi nes 
education systems as a set of accountability relationships that must be aligned in order 
to improve learning outcomes. The relationships include “delegation” which means that 
the responsible actors are focused on promoting learning; financing the actors and the 
programs that contribute to learning; using information to measure and monitor learning 
outcomes; and aligning incentives and rewards to learning objectives. According to 
this framework, without a coherent education system built to improve learning, even 
rigorously proven interventions (such as higher teacher pay, greater autonomy for teachers 
over classroom practices, more textbooks, smaller class sizes) will not necessarily produce 
better learning. They are likely to work only if they address a weakness in any of the 
above accountability relationships.4
In this paper we examine the relationship between the quality of a country’s 
education system and education outcome measures. We address the following question: 
Do countries with a better education system achieve better education outcomes? In 
particular, we analyze the relationship between system quality indicators and four 
measures of education outcomes that are comparable across countries, using regression 
analyses with controls for countries’ level of per-capita GDP, per-student spending level 
for education, and average education level of the adult population. To our knowledge, this 
type of quantitative analysis using an aggregate measure of the quality of the education 
system across countries has not been undertaken for developing countries. The most 
relevant literature in this respect are those that have quantitative indicators of a broad 
yet single aspect of the education system such as the overall quality of teachers,5 school 
management and governance,6 corruption within the system,7 and the existence and supply 
of private schools.8
The next section describes the measures of the quality of the education system 
that we use. Section III presents descriptive statistics on education outcomes, the quality 
of the education system, and country characteristics. Section IV discusses the results 
from regression analyses of the relationships among these variables using different 
specifi cations.  Finally, Section V summarizes our conclusions.
9 The SABER program aims to give all parties with a stake in educational results?from students and 
teachers and parents to policymakers, business people, and political leaders?an accessible, detailed, 
objective, and up-to-date snapshot of how well their country's education system is oriented toward 
delivering learning. The program is described in http://saber.worldbank.org/index.cfm?indx=5.
10 The SABER team developed a data-collection instrument appropriate for collecting data for the 
policy and institutional indicators for each policy domain. This instrument relies on an experienced 
principal investigator in each country who collects information from key informants, documents, 
and other data sources. Data collection can usually be completed within a few weeks. An alternative 
approach used in some policy domains has been to convene a workshop of experts, including 
government offi cials, and use that group process to collect the evidence and code data. In either 
case, data sources are clearly identifi ed and available to the public as the data are posted online 
(World Bank, 2013). For more information, http://saber.worldbank.org/index.cfm.
11 One might expect the quality of implementation to change more frequently, not necessarily in 
the forward direction in each political administration, while policies tend to be more "sticky" and, 
in theory at least, to serve as guiding norms for managing and operating the education system. A 
hard challenge for many countries is to reduce the discrepancy between good policies and actual 
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Data Sources 
       
For our analysis, we use data from the World Bank’s Systems Approach to Better 
Education Results (SABER) initiative (World Bank, 2016b). This program has been 
collecting data on the policies and institutions of education systems around the world, and 
benchmarks them against practices associated with effective learning.9 The metrics are 
designed principally to identify policy areas which are weak and in need of improvement 
in a particular country, using a structured questionnaire to underpin that analysis. This 
ongoing effort has generated a database that captures different aspects of the education 
systems in about 100 countries, based on measures that can be easily compared across 
education systems. 
The SABER program collects comparable, well-defi ned, quantitative and qualitative 
data on policies and institutions across countries.  For each policy domain, the program 
defi nes the critical elements that countries have to get right in order to achieve the best 
outcomes; these are based on extensive reviews of research, global evidence and expert 
opinion. The reviews are summarized in a suite of framework papers on several policy 
domains, such as “What Matters for Teacher Policy” (Vegas & Ganimian, 2013) and “What 
Matters for Student Assessment” (Clarke, 2012). These framework papers are the bases 
for the design of the questionnaire for each policy domain, and for the development of 
specifi c rubrics that are designed to ensure cross-country comparability and replicability.10 
While the focus of the SABER program has been to document countries’ education 
policies (de jure), some of the questionnaires also contain elements about policy 
implementation (de facto).11
There are other quantitative databases that have globally comparable metrics of 
certain characteristics of the education system. For example, the OECD’s Teaching and 
Learning International Survey (TALIS) program collects data about teachers and school 
leaders (OECD, 2018) ; however, in 2013 the survey covered just 34, mostly high-income, 
12 It would be possible to link country-level data on teacher quality from OECD’s Teaching and 
Learning International survey (TALIS) data to the average student assessment from PISA, but 
even 2018 TALIS covers only about a dozen less advanced countries (OECD, 2013, 2018). TALIS 
collects data regarding six thematic areas, including teaching practices, the classroom environment, 
and school leadership. 
13 The UNESCO country reports follow a guideline about what information should be included, 
but the reports tend to vary greatly in terms of the breadth and depth of the available detail. For 
more information, see http://www.ibe.unesco.org/en/document/world-data-education-seventh-
edition-2010-11.
Table 1.  What education systems need to get right about teacher policy and student 
assessment
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Source of data: World Bank. (2016b). Systems Approach for Better Education Results (SABER) data.
http://saber.worldbank.org/index.cfm
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countries.12 UNESCO’s International Bureau of Education (IBE) collects a trove of 
country reports on the education system, but the contents of these reports are diffi cult to 
use in a quantitative analysis without applying a set of rubrics to transform the generally 
qualitative information into comparable cross-country data.13 
SABER aggregates policy and institutional indicators to assess a policy domain. The 
ratings are on a 4-point scale for each aspect of a domain: “Latent” (with an index value 
of 1); “Emerging” (2); “Established” (3); and “Advanced” (4). A SABER rating indicates 
whether or not the policies in a domain are as high in quality or maturity as what is 
regarded by global research and policy experts to be best practice. The overall rating for a 
policy domain is a composite of the ratings on all aspects of that policy domain (unweighted 
average). Each country gets a rating for each policy domain that has been covered by 
SABER in that country. Table 1 illustrates what the four-scale rating means for two policy 
domains, teachers and student assessments.
14 The SABER program is ongoing, so it should be possible to update this analysis with a larger 
number of countries and use more domains to estimate the quality index for each country. In 
addition, as more developing countries participate in cross-national student assessments, global or 
regional, it will be possible to expand the sample size of this study.
15 This program provides ratings on all sectors of the economy, such as agriculture, health, and 
energy. Our analysis uses the ratings only for the education sector. 
16 See World Bank (2016a) for a description of the criteria used to rate each dimension in the CPIA 
database.
17 The Gallup World Poll contains information on satisfaction with the educational system for 166 
countries over multiple years, based on surveys that average 1,115 respondents per country and per 
time period.  For most of the countries, data are available every year between 2006 and 2015.  The 
specifi c Gallup poll question that we used is: “In the city or area where you live, are you satisfi ed or 
dissatisfi ed with the educational system or the schools?” For a description of what the Gallup World 
Poll is, see https://www.gallup.com/analytics/232838/world-poll.aspx. We purchased Gallup’s 
education data in connection with our background paper for the Education Commission report 
(2016).
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In the following analyses, we take the average SABER rating across policy domains 
to arrive at a single value for the quality index of the education system in each country. 
The SABER program is ongoing and its data are not yet available across all policy 
domains for every country, so we are not able to examine the relationship between specifi c 
policy areas and education outcomes. Instead, our analysis is based on a country’s average 
rating across the domains for which data are available.  For some countries, this overall 
index is computed on the basis of ratings for seven domains, while in others, the index is 
based on only two or even just one domain, depending on how many SABER assessments 
have been undertaken for a country at the time of our analysis. In all, we estimate index 
values for almost 100 countries, but the intersection of countries with SABER data and 
those with student learning data yields a smaller sample size of 70.14  We interpret the 
country average index as refl ecting the overall quality of the country’s education system.
As a robustness check to the SABER data, we also analyze the ratings from the 
education component of the World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessment 
(CPIA) index (World Bank, 2016a).15 In contrast to the SABER data which are based on 
the responses of experts and country respondents to questionnaires about specifi c aspects 
of policies and on policy documents, CPIA education ratings are assessments made by 
World Bank staff on six main dimensions of the quality of the primary and secondary 
education in each country. The six dimensions are sector strategy, education management 
and information system, student assessments, teachers, education finance, and school-
based management.16
To measure the outcomes of education systems, we use the Barro-Lee estimates 
of the average completed years of schooling in each country (Barro & Lee, 2013), 
academic proficiency levels from several student assessments (Altinok, Diebolt, & De 
Meulemeester, 2013), and self-reported satisfaction rates with the education system 
from the Gallup Poll of 2015.17 Because the current regional and international student 
assessments are not strictly comparable in terms of age, grade or being curriculum-based, 
instead of student test scores, we use the percentage shares of students who perform at 
Figure 2.  Four education outcomes: years of schooling, shares with minimum and 
advanced profi ciency levels, and percent satisfi ed with education system
Data sources: Altinok et al. (2013) for harmonized test scores; Gallup World Poll (2015) education 
data for percent of people satisfi ed with their education system; and Barro & Lee (2013) for 
estimated completed years of schooling.
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the minimum profciency level (defi ned as one standard deviation below a score of 400) 
and those who score at the advanced profi ciency level (defi ned as one standard deviation 
above a score of 400) (Altinok et al., 2013). 
Descriptive Analyses
       
Figure 2 presents the distribution of countries with respect to four education 
outcomes. Pairing outcomes suggests that education systems that succeed in one outcome 
tend to do well also in the other outcomes. For example, countries with a larger percentage 
of students with at least a minimum proficiency level in learning assessments are also 
more likely to have a larger percentage of students meeting the advanced profi ciency level 
(upper left panel), although this positive relationship is more marked in countries where 
the percentage of students reaching the minimum profi ciency level exceeds 80 percent. 
In the countries where the share of students reaching minimum profi ciency is below 80 
percent, the share of students who achieve advanced competency hovers at 10 percent or 
lower. 
Figure 3.  Education system quality, GDP per capita, education expenditures and 
adult years of schooling 
Data sources: World Bank SABER data (2016b); World Bank Development Indicators (2016c); 
Barro & Lee (2013) 
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There is also a positive relationship between average completed years of schooling, 
as provided by the Barro-Lee database, and student proficiency levels. Some countries 
have high average years of schooling without the majority of students reaching the 
minimum profi ciency level (lower left panel), suggesting that success in raising enrollment 
or years of schooling does not necessarily mean success in raising learning outcomes. 
However, countries that have lower average completed schooling are the countries that 
have a lower percentage of students who achieve advanced proficiency (lower right 
panel). 
Figure 2 suggests only a weak relationship between average completed years of 
schooling and the share of the population who say they are satisfi ed with their education 
system, according to the Gallup poll (upper right panel). Interestingly, in some countries 
that have attained very high average years of schooling (e.g., Korea with 12.5 years), a 
lower share of the population is satisfied with their education system than in countries 
that have attained much lower completed years of schooling (e.g., Cambodia with just 5.7 
years).
Figure 3 plots the variables that are likely to be associated with education outcomes, 
besides system quality—a country’s GDP per capita, average schooling of the adult 
population (aged 50-54), and education expenditures as measured by the per-student 
spending at the primary level—against the SABER system quality index.  Previous 
18 See, for example, Dufl o, Hanna, & Ryan (2012) and Muralidharan & Sundararaman (2011).
19 See Bruns et al. (forthcoming) for an illustration of classroom observation methods for measuring 
teaching quality in Brazil. Another important measure of the quality of teaching is whether teachers 
come to class (Bold et al., 2016).
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research has shown the first two control variables to be related to education outcomes, 
both possibly capturing the demand for education in the economy and the value that 
parents place on education. Student-level studies have consistently found that parents’ 
education (either of one or both parents) has a positive effect on their children’s school 
participation and completed years of schooling (for example, Orazem & King, 2007). 
There are fewer studies on the effect of parents’ education on learning outcomes, but they 
tend to fi nd also a positive relationship (Hanushek & Woessmann, 2015).
Controlling for the country’s income level, education spending per student indicates 
not only the aggregate level of school inputs, but also the country’s willingness to allocate 
sufficient resources for education. In developing countries, the share of salary costs in 
education expenditures varies widely, reaching 94% in the case of Togo in 2014, for 
example.  Previous research on the impact of increased public funding for education 
portray a mixed picture of that impact. If that spending goes to building and staffing 
schools in areas where no school previously existed, however, then spending increases 
enrollment (Hanushek, 2003; Glewwe, Hanushek, Humpage, & Ravina, 2011). Fewer 
studies have estimated this relationship with respect to student learning, but experimental 
and quasi-experimental evidence show that increases in some school inputs, especially for 
teachers, do raise student learning.18 Those expenditures must be able to affect not only 
the quality of teachers employed in schools or the share who are trained, but also their 
teaching practices and their interaction with students in the classroom.19 
Figure 3 also shows that both per-capita GDP (in constant PPP $) and current per-
student expenditures in primary education are positively associated with the system quality 
index, but there is no clear association with the average schooling of the adult population 
aged 50-54 (or parental generation). Countries with a good education system (defi ned as 
those with a SABER index value greater than 2.5) tend to be wealthier and tend to spend 
more public resources per primary student. Many countries spend less than $1,000 per 
primary-school student while other countries spend at least five times more. Education 
spending and system quality are positively associated but this association is evident only 
for countries that spend more than $1000 per student, implying that a minimum level of 
education spending may be necessary to ensure a good education system.
In the four panels of Figure 4, we show the distribution of the four education 
outcomes against a system quality measure based on whether the SABER index value 
is greater or less than 2.5. The graphs show the mean values of the education outcomes, 
as well as the values corresponding to the 25th and 75th percentiles and also to the 5th and 
95th percentiles. In this descriptive analysis (that is, without controls for other variables), 
the countries that meet the SABER threshold value have far better education outcomes. 
The differences between the countries above and those below the threshold value of 2.5 
Figure 4. Distribution of four education outcomes, by quality of the education 
system, without control variables (Source: Authors’ calculations)
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for the SABER score are notable—over two more years in terms of the average years 
of schooling, over 30 percentage points in the share of students reaching the minimum 
profi ciency level, over 10 percentage points in the share of students reaching the advanced 
proficiency level, and 10 percentage points in the satisfaction rate with the national 
education system.  
Regression Results 
We now turn to our principal fi ndings about the relationship between the quality of 
education systems and education outcomes. Our regression results support the expectation 
that better education systems achieve better education outcomes.
Results using SABER data 
We use alternative specifications of the quality of the education system variable. 
The estimated relationship between system quality and education outcomes is positive 
whether the quality variable is measured by the SABER aggregate index or by a dummy 
variable which equals one if the average SABER value is above a threshold of 2.5 (Table 
2). 20,21  This positive association holds even as controls are added, as shown by the full 
estimates in Appendix Table A1. When controlling for a country’s GDP per capita and the 
average education level of adults aged 50-54, the results suggest that, of countries with 
20 We explored alternative threshold values for SABER, including 2 and 2.25. We fi nd that there is a 
higher positive association with education outcomes with the more stringent rating of 2.5.
21 As mentioned earlier, SABER ratings categorize the level of the quality of education policies in 
a domain as latent, emerging, established and advanced.  To generate the four categories, a total 
score is calculated based on the rating of individual policies that make up each domain.  In our 
aggregation, the same cut-off points are applied to the total score as are used in aggregating up the 
individual scores within a policy domain.
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System quality:
Average SABER 0.162** 0.118*** 1.935*** 0.104*






























Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Notes: Appendix Table A1 contains the full regression results. The control variables included in the regressions are
GDP per capita, average years of schooling of the adult cohort, aged 50-54, and a constant term.
Source: Authors’ calculations
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similar levels of GDP per capita or adult education levels, those with a better education 
system are likely to have more years of schooling for its youth, a higher proportion of 
students meeting the minimum and advanced profi ciency levels in multi-country learning 
assessments, and more of the general population being satisfied with their education 
system. With controls, the size of the education system coefficients is smaller, but in 
general, not dramatically so. Even with controls, in education systems that pass the 
threshold (SABER score>2.5), the share of students who reach the minimum profi ciency 
level is 25 percent higher, the share who reach the advanced proficiency level is 14 
percent higher, the average schooling is 2.6 years higher, and the satisfaction rate with the 
education system is greater by 15 percentage points.
In contrast, the average expenditure level for basic education, even when included 
by itself and without the system quality variable, is not signifi cantly associated with any 
of the education outcomes (Appendix Table A1), and its inclusion does not signifi cantly 
change the coeffi cient of system quality. In fact, for average years of schooling, the per-
student expenditure level has a significantly negative coefficient. Spending more for 
education per student, by itself, does not appear to benefit education outcomes, and 
whatever effect it has seems to be dominated by the quality of the education system. 
We explore this observation further by adding also an interaction term between system 
quality and expenditures. Results change only in the proficiency-related outcomes: 







































36.0 46.6 59.6 73.5 74.8 83.5
Percent of people
satisfied with their
education system 53.6 56.0 61.0 69.0 58.5 71.8
Average completed
years of schooling 5.7 6.4 8.3 9.1 8.0 10.2
Source: Authors' calculations using their regression results, with controls for education spending and
average level of education of adults aged 50-54.
The Benefi ts of a Better Education System: What Cross-Country Data Can Tell Us
－ 119 －
a loss in statistical significance for system quality with no change in the magnitude 
of its coefficient, and no positive change in the statistical significance of per-student 
expenditure.  
The above regression results support some optimism about the ability of low- and 
middle-income countries to overtake richer countries in terms of the quality of education 
systems, which is aligned with the relationships implied by Figure 3 which do not control 
systematically for other country characteristics. Optimistically, these countries can have 
as good education outcomes as higher-income countries if they have a good education 
system, although few low-income countries in the current SABER database score above 2. 
In the same vein, higher-income countries may do no better than middle-income countries 
if they do not have a better education system. Per-capita GDP does not fi gure signifi cantly 
in any of the regressions, with the exception of one specification for the proportion of 
students reaching the advanced profi ciency level. Table 3 is a simple illustration of these 
fi ndings.
Consistent with the existing literature (and contrary to the descriptive analyses 
without controls), the regression results show the expected intergenerational effect of 
education (Appendix Table A1). In all the regressions, the average years of schooling of 
adults aged 50-54 have a signifi cant positive association with current education outcomes. 
In countries where the parent generation completed an average of one more year of 
schooling, the share of students reaching the minimum proficiency is higher by 2.8-5 
percent and students reaching advanced competency by 1.2-3.4 percent, depending on the 
specifi cation of the system quality variable.  The average completed years of schooling is 
up by almost half a year across the specifi cations, while the share of the population who 
are satisfi ed with their education system is higher only by 0.4-1.5 percent. 
Table 4.  Comparing the distributions of the SABER and CPIA scores
minimum
proficiency









Minimum value 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4
25th percentile 2.08 2.08 2.0 2.0
50th percentile 2.33 2.33 2.33 2.33
75th percentile 2.80 2.80 2.75 2.75
Maximum value 4 4 4 4
Mean 2.46 2.46 2.40 2.43
Standard deviation .65 .65 .63 .62
N 34 34 39 37
B. Rescaled CPIA score, full sample (for SABER subsample only, in parentheses)
Minimum value 2  (2) 2  (2) 2   (2) 2   (2)
25th percentile 2.44  (2.44) 2.44   (2.44) 2.44   (2.44) 2.44   (2.44)
50th percentile 2.67  (2.72) 2.67   (2.72) 2.67   (2.78) 2.67   (2.78)
75th percentile 3  (3) 3   (3) 3   (3) 3   (3.11)
Maximum value 3.78  (3.78) 3.78   (3.78) 3.78   (3.78) 3.78   (3.78)
Mean 2.76  (2.77) 2.76   (2.76) 2.75   (2.78) 2.76   (2.81)
Standard deviation .40  (.44) .40   (.44) .39   (.43) .39  (.42)
N 53  (28) 53   (28) 65   (33) 65   (31)
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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A robustness check 
In this section, we use an alternative measure of the quality of the education system, 
the CPIA index produced by World Bank staff. Using this index has the advantage that 
the data related to each dimension of an education system are available for a much larger 
number of countries. The CPIA index on the education sector has six core components 
that are graded on a six-point scale, although hardly any country has been given the 
lowest rating and only a few countries have been assigned the top rating. Based on this 
compressed distribution, we rescale the CPIA score to a four-point scale (Table 4). As 
a check on the comparability of the SABER and CPIA ratings, we undertake regression 
analyses on the full CPIA sample as well as on a sample consisting of only those countries 
with also a SABER score. 
Table 5 shows the results when the same control variables are included as in the 
prior regression analysis. Similar to the fi ndings from the regressions using the SABER 
data presented in Table 2, the quality of the education system is signifi cantly associated 
with learning outcomes, as measured by the percent shares of students reaching the 
minimum profi ciency level and those reaching the advanced profi ciency. However, while 
the coeffi cients across the two CPIA samples (full and subsample of SABER countries 
only) are qualitatively similar, they are not statistically signifi cant in the smaller sample 
of SABER countries.  In contrast to the results using the SABER score, the coeffi cient of 
the CPIA score is not statistically signifi cant for either the years of average schooling or 
the percent of the population satisfi ed with the education system. Part of the reason for 
the generally weaker associations of the policy variables with the educational outcomes 















A. Rescaled CPIA, full CPIA sample
0.0142 0.0175** -0.167 -0.0151Per-student expenditure in
primary/1000 (0.0179) (0.00821) (0.174) (0.0178)
0.144*** 0.0898*** -0.156 -0.0248Rescaled CPIA average score
(0.0535) (0.0245) (0.463) (0.0488)
B. CPIA dummy variable, full CPIA sample
0.0165 0.0197** -0.168 -0.0152Per-student expenditure in
primary/1000 (0.0179) (0.00863) (0.173) (0.0178)
0.0944** 0.0447** -0.133 -0.0225Dummy=1 if Average CPIA
score > 2.75 (0.0376) (0.0181) (0.335) (0.0350)
C. Rescaled CPIA, SABER countries only
0.0286 0.0146 -0.185 -0.00942Per-student expenditure
in primary/1000 (0.0215) (0.00956) (0.216) (0.0232)
0.110 0.0898** -0.181 -0.0539Rescaled CPIA average score
(0.0738) (0.0328) (0.673) (0.0738)
D. CPIA dummy variable, SABER countries only
0.0288 0.0161 -0.187 -0.00953Per-student expenditure in
primary/1000 (0.0216) (0.0106) (0.217) (0.0233)
0.0777 0.0310 -0.0176 -0.0194Dummy=1 if Average CPIA
score > 2.75 (0.0555) (0.0272) (0.507) (0.0564)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: Authors’ calculations; full results corresponding to Table 4 are in Appendix Table A3.
22 See Appendix Table A4 for the full results using alternative threshold values for estimating the 
CPIA dummy variables.
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with the CPIA measure as opposed to the SABER measure may be due to the compressed 
distribution of the CPIA score, shown in Table 4.  As with the SABER specifi cations, we 
undertake robustness analyses using the CPIA data by using alternative threshold values 
of system quality; the results vary when alternative threshold values of 2.5 and 3 are set.22  
The regression analysis here and in the previous section use average SABER and 
CPIA scores to measure the quality of the whole education system. As mentioned above, 
the SABER program has scored individual policy domains of the system, but as of this 
writing, SABER data on all domains are not complete, and we are not able to identify the 
domains of the education system that may be more or less critical to education outcomes. 
Because such an analysis could be useful, we re-estimated our model using the individual 
CPIA scores for dimensions of the education system. The results do not point strongly to 
any one dimension being dominant, except perhaps having a serious sector strategy (SST) 
which does appear to be associated with a higher proportion of students reaching the 
minimum profi ciency level (Appendix Table A5). The coeffi cients for teacher policies and 
school management are signifi cant only for a subset of our estimates. 
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Conclusions 
The magnitude of the current call for more education and learning is unprecedented, 
as exemplified by the UN Sustainable Development Goals for 2030, the report The 
Learning Generation (Education Commission, 2017), and the World Development Report 
Learning to Realize Education’s Promise (World Bank, 2018). Most striking about this 
global call is the clear shift in focus to quality education and improvements in learning. 
In response to the Education for All movement in the 1990s, governments dramatically 
increased the capacity of their school systems to enroll students, mostly by building many 
more classrooms and recruiting many more teachers than ever before. Learning outcomes, 
as measured by even basic student assessments, however, have not kept up with this 
progress. 
Research about how to improve learning point to a large number of factors 
besides investments in more classrooms, more textbooks, and even more teachers; these 
include the quality of teaching, time spent on actual learning, appropriate curriculum, 
and language of instruction (Bruns et al., 2011). Top school systems in the world pay 
a great deal of attention to how they select their staff; they work hard to improve the 
performance of schools, provide an environment in which teachers work together to 
frame good practice, and establish smart pathways for teachers to grow in their careers. 
They are able to achieve these improvements because their education systems are 
organized, adequately resourced, and led by managers who are accountable for their 
performance. Strong education systems have standards, academic curricula, financing, 
information and other structured processes that are coherent and aligned towards 
achieving education goals. In contrast, weak education systems struggle to achieve that 
alignment and coherence: their standards, goals and rules are not clearly defined; the 
inputs are inappropriate or inadequate; resources are used ineffi ciently and accountability 
mechanisms are weak. Moreover, these systems are not suffi ciently dynamic to adjust to 
shifts in the socioeconomic and political contexts, as well as to changes in the fi nancial 
and management capacities of the country.
Our analyses of the relationship between measures of the quality of an education 
system and education outcomes suggest that system quality matters for student 
performance, completed years of schooling, and people’s regard for their education 
system. This positive association holds, controlling for country-level factors that may 
affect these education outcomes, suggesting that education outcomes are not likely to 
improve if the education system is weak. Previous cross-country analyses have included 
system-level variables such as average pupil-teacher ratio, percentage of teachers trained, 
or public spending for education, but those measures pertain to input levels rather than the 
overall quality of the system. 
There is no internationally comparable, rigorous quantitative measure of education 
system quality on less advanced countries, although elements of such a measure exist 
through (uncoordinated) efforts by OECD, UNESCO, the World Bank, and the McKinsey 
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consulting company.  The SABER data we use come from a promising initiative by 
the World Bank, but this database is far from complete, with data on many developing 
countries and on several policy domains still missing.  Our results provide initial support 
for investing in such a database.  
Acknowledgements
This paper was originally prepared as a background paper for the Education Commission 
(International Commission on Financing Global Education Opportunity), launched at the 
UN General Assembly in September 2017. We are grateful to Dandan Chen who provided 
excellent assistance with compiling and organizing the database for this analysis. We 
also thank Luis Benveniste, Deon Filmer, Halsey Rogers, and other education staff of the 
World Bank for their useful comments; and Liesbet Steer, Ore Oluwa Badaki, Nicholas 
Burnett, Bridget Crimpton, Paul Isenman and Babette Wils for their comments on earlier 
versions of our work. Any remaining errors are entirely ours.
References
Altinok, N., C. Diebolt, & J.-L. De Meulemeester. (2013). A New International Database on 
Education Quality: 1965-2010. Applied Economics, 46(11), 1212-1247.
Ashley, L.D., McLoughlin, C., Aslam, M., Engel, J., Wales, J., Rawal, S., Batley, R., Kingdon, 
G., Nicolai, S., & Rose, P. (2014). The role and impact of private schools in developing 
countries. Rigorous Literature Review.
Barro, R. J., & Lee, J. W. (2013). A new data set of educational attainment in the world, 
1950-2010. Journal of Development Economics, 104(1), 184-198.
Ben, J., Andrés, S.H., & Steffen, K. (2012). The experience of new teachers results from TALIS 
2008: Results from TALIS 2008. Paris: OECD publishing.
Bold, T., Filmer, D., Martin, G., Molina, E., Stacy, B., Rockmore, C., Svensson, J., & Wane, W. 
(2016). What Do Teachers Know and Do in Primary Schools in Sub-Saharan Africa?  AERC 
and World Bank Group.
Bruns, B., Costa, L., & Cunha, N. (forthcoming). Through the Looking Glass: Can classroom 
observation and feedback improve teacher performance in Brazil? Economics of Education 
Review. 
Bruns, B., Filmer, D., & Patrinos, H. A. (2011). Making schools work: New evidence on 
accountability reforms. Washington, DC: World Bank Publications.
Bruns, B., & Luque, J. (2014). Great Teachers: How to Raise Student Learning in Latin 
America and the Caribbean. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
Clarke, M. (2012). What Matters Most for Student Assessment Systems: A Framework Paper. 
READ/SABER Working Paper Series 1. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Duflo, E., Hanna, R., & Ryan, S.P. (2012). Incentives work: Getting teachers to come to 
school. American Economic Review, 102(4), 1241-78.
John L. Newman, Elizabeth M. King and Husein Abdul-Hamid
－ 124 －
Education Commission. (2017). The Learning Generation. New York: International 
Commission on Financing Global Education Opportunity. 
http://report.educationcommission.org/.
Ferraz, C., Finan, F., & Moreira, D. B. (2012). Corrupting learning: evidence from missing 
federal education funds in Brazil. Journal of Public Economics, 96(9), 712-726.
Gallup World Poll. (2016). https://www.gallup.com/analytics/232838/world-poll.aspx
Glewwe, P. W., Hanushek, E. A., Humpage, S. D., & Ravina, R. (2011). School resources and 
educational outcomes in developing countries: A review of the literature from 1990 to 2010. 
National Bureau of Economic Research, w17554.
Hanushek, E. A. (2003). The failure of input - based schooling policies. The Economic 
Journal, 113(485), F64-F98.
Hanushek, E. A., & L. Woessmann. (2015). The Knowledge Capital of Nations: Education and 
the Economics of Growth. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
James, E. (1993). Why do different countries choose a different public-private mix of 
educational services? Journal of Human Resources 28(3), 571-592.
Mourshed, M., C. Chijioke, & M. Barber. (2010). How the World’s Most Improved School 
Systems Keep Getting Better. New York: McKinsey & Company.
Muralidharan, K., & Sundararaman, V. (2011). Teacher performance pay: Experimental 
evidence from India. Journal of political Economy, 119(1), 39-77.
National Center for Education Studies. (2015). Trends in International Mathematics and 
Science Study (TIMSS) report. https://nces.ed.gov/TIMSS/.
OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development). (2013). PISA 2012 
Results in Focus: What 15-Year-Olds Know and What They Can Do with What They Know. 
Paris: OECD.
OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development). (2015, 2018) Teaching 
and Learning International Survey (TALIS) data extracted from http://www.oecd.org/edu/
school/talis.htm.
Orazem, P.F., & King, E.M. (2007). Schooling in developing countries: The roles of supply, 
demand and government policy. Handbook of Development Economics, 4, 3475-3559.
Pritchett, L. (2015). Creating Education Systems Coherent for Learning Outcomes: Making 
the Transition from Schooling to Learning. RISE Working Paper 005
UNESCO (2016). World Data on Education. Geneva: International Bureau of Education (IBE). 
http://www.ibe.unesco.org/en/document/world-data-education-seventh-edition-2010-11
Vegas, E., & Ganimian, A. (2013). Theory and evidence on teacher policies in developed and 
developing Countries. Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank.
World Bank. (2016a). Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) data extracted from 
https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/dataset/country-policy-and-institutional-assessment
World Bank. (2015). EdStats; Education Statistics Dashboard. World Bank, Washington, DC. 
http://datatopics.worldbank.org/education/.
World Bank. (2016b). Systems Approach for Better Education Results (SABER) data. 
http://saber.worldbank.org/index.cfm
The Benefi ts of a Better Education System: What Cross-Country Data Can Tell Us
－ 125 －
World Bank. (2016c). World Development Indicators. 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=2&series=SE.SEC.PRIV.
ZS&country=#
World Bank. (2018). World Development Report.  Learning to Realize Education’s Promise. 
Washington, DC: The World Bank Group. 
Appendix Table A1. Regression Analyses Using SABER to Measure Education 
System Quality
Using average SABER score Using SABER dummy
Variables [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
A. Percent Reaching Minimum Proficiency
System quality 0.181** 0.162** 0.140 0.264*** 0.253***
(0.069) (0.0603) (0.0836) (0.0746) (0.0655)
Per-student expenditure 0.00694 0.00546 -0.00946 0.00532
   in primary education (0.00601) (0.0163) (0.0419) (0.0150)
System quality x Expenditure 0.00616
(0.0159)
Adult schooling, aged 50-54 0.0504*** 0.0285*** 0.0390*** 0.0392*** 0.0333*** 0.0429***
(0.00577) (0.00933) (0.00888) (0.00901) (0.0086) (0.00789)
GDP per capita, 2014 $ PPP 0.000780 0.00158 0.000480 0.000334 0.000699 -0.000473
(0.000939) (0.00198) (0.00267) (0.00273) (0.00189) (0.00247)
Constant 0.243*** -0.0382 -0.0641 -0.0160 0.303*** 0.246***
(0.0397) (0.146) (0.127) (0.179) (0.0563) (0.049)
Observations 99 44 40 40 44 40
R-squared 0.649 0.538 0.678 0.679 0.587 0.728
B. Percent Reaching Advanced Proficiency
System quality 0.119*** 0.118*** -0.0390 0.123*** 0.145***
(0.0376) (0.0382) (0.0355) (0.0439) (0.0446)
Per-student expenditure 0.00676 0.000876 -0.105*** 0.000854
   in primary education (0.00429) (0.0103) (0.0178) (0.0102)
System quality x Expenditure 0.0436***
(0.00675)
Adult schooling, aged 50-54 0.0246*** 0.0131** 0.0136** 0.0153*** 0.0163*** 0.0168***
(0.00412) (0.00509) (0.00562) (0.00383) (0.00506) (0.00537)
GDP per capita, 2014 $ PPP 0.00125* 0.00146 0.00164 0.000601 0.00161 0.00147
(0.000670) (0.00108) (0.00169) (0.00116) (0.00111) (0.00168)
Constant -0.0552* -0.247*** -0.246*** 0.0944 -0.0213 -0.0209
(0.0283) (0.0795) (0.0804) (0.0759) (0.0331) (0.0334)
Observations 99 44 40 40 44 40
R-squared 0.578 0.592 0.638 0.838 0.574 0.646
C. Average years of schooling
System quality 1.574*** 1.935*** 2.207*** 1.927*** 2.623***
(0.489) (0.530) (0.713) (0.605) (0.663)
Per-student expenditure -0.149** -0.327** -0.115 -0.336**
   in primary education (0.0579) (0.145) (0.394) (0.142)
System quality x Expenditure -0.0844
(0.146)
Adult schooling, aged 50-54 0.429*** 0.417*** 0.448*** 0.445*** 0.450*** 0.500***
(0.0527) (0.0715) (0.0809) (0.0818) (0.07) (0.0773)
GDP per capita, 2014 $ PPP 0.0237*** -0.00871 0.0190 0.0198 -0.00761 0.0164
(0.00904) (0.0147) (0.0209) (0.0211) (0.0145) (0.0206)
Constant 5.083*** 1.710* 0.999 0.423 4.610*** 4.639***
(0.341) (1.004) (1.104) (1.494) (0.445) (0.468)
Observations 117 59 49 49 59 49
R-squared 0.482 0.584 0.629 0.632 0.583 0.644
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D. Percent satisfied with education system
System quality 0.106** 0.104* 0.0742 0.125** 0.148**
(0.0471) (0.0543) (0.0712) (0.0571) (0.0658)
Per-student expenditure -0.000233 -0.00763 -0.0300 -0.00762
   in primary education (0.00576) (0.0152) (0.0375) (0.015)
System quality x Expenditure 0.00924
(0.0142)
Adult schooling, aged 50-54 0.00434 0.0122* 0.00703 0.00754 0.0148** 0.0103
(0.00460) (0.00655) (0.00802) (0.00811) (0.00638) (0.00758)
GDP per capita, 2014 $ PPP 0.00163 0.000191 0.00164 0.00137 0.000264 0.00121
(0.00107) (0.00147) (0.00249) (0.00255) (0.00147) (0.00249)
Constant 0.575*** 0.270*** 0.313*** 0.376** 0.465*** 0.508***
(0.0296) (0.0953) (0.111) (0.148) (0.0409) (0.0454)
Observations 109 54 45 45 54 45
R-squared 0.112 0.295 0.253 0.261 0.291 0.276
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: Authors’ calculations
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Appendix Table A2. Regression Analyses using Alternative Thresholds for SABER 
Index 
]3[]2[]1[selbairaV
A. Using a SABER threshold value of 2.0
































B. Using a SABER threshold value of 2.25
































Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Specifications: (1) only SABER dummy variable and constant term; (2) SABER dummy variable and control
variables; (3) SABER dummy variable, per-student expenditure, and control variables.
Source: Authors’ calculations
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A. Rescaled CPIA, full CPIA sample
0.0142 0.0175** -0.167 -0.0151Per-student expenditure in
primary/1000 (0.0179) (0.00821) (0.174) (0.0178)
0.144*** 0.0898*** -0.156 -0.0248Rescaled CPIA average score
(0.0535) (0.0245) (0.463) (0.0488)
0.0332*** 0.00845** 0.328*** 0.000800Adult schooling
(cohort aged 50-54) (0.00795) (0.00365) (0.0694) (0.00775)
0.00573 0.00107 0.148*** 0.00604GDP per capita
(2014 $ PPP/1000) (0.00406) (0.00186) (0.0393) (0.00408)
-0.124 -0.236*** 5.021*** 0.643***Constant
(0.145) (0.0667) (1.230) (0.130)
Observations 61 61 77 72
R-squared 0.622 0.580 0.602 0.044
B. CPIA dummy variable, full CPIA sample
0.0165 0.0197** -0.168 -0.0152Per-student expenditure in
primary/1000 (0.0179) (0.00863) (0.173) (0.0178)
0.0944** 0.0447** -0.133 -0.0225Dummy=1 if Average CPIA
score > 2.75 (0.0376) (0.0181) (0.335) (0.0350)
0.0314*** 0.00723* 0.330*** 0.00104Adult schooling
(cohort aged 50-54) (0.00796) (0.00383) (0.0691) (0.00773)
0.00792* 0.00249 0.146*** 0.00564GDP per capita
(2014 $ PPP/1000) (0.00398) (0.00192) (0.0383) (0.00398)
0.211*** -0.0206 4.670*** 0.588***Constant
(0.0442) (0.0213) (0.365) (0.0390)
Observations 61 61 77 72
R-squared 0.616 0.531 0.603 0.047
C. Rescaled CPIA, SABER countries only
0.0286 0.0146 -0.185 -0.00942Per-student expenditure
in primary/1000 (0.0215) (0.00956) (0.216) (0.0232)
0.110 0.0898** -0.181 -0.0539Rescaled CPIA average score
(0.0738) (0.0328) (0.673) (0.0738)
0.0303*** 0.00853* 0.350*** 0.000835Adult schooling
(cohort aged 50-54) (0.00992) (0.00440) (0.0922) (0.0103)
0.00852 0.00483* 0.202*** 0.00793GDP per capita
(2014 $ PPP/1000) (0.00579) (0.00257) (0.0587) (0.00630)
-0.0643 -0.250** 4.649** 0.688***Constant
(0.208) (0.0924) (1.880) (0.208)
Observations 31 31 38 35
R-squared 0.729 0.753 0.721 0.093
D. CPIA dummy variable, SABER countries only
0.0288 0.0161 -0.187 -0.00953Per-student expenditure in
primary/1000 (0.0216) (0.0106) (0.217) (0.0233)
Dummy=1 if Average CPIA 0.0777 0.0310 -0.0176 -0.0194
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score > 2.75 (0.0555) (0.0272) (0.507) (0.0564)
0.0304*** 0.00640 0.357*** 0.00186Adult schooling
(cohort aged 50-54) (0.0101) (0.00494) (0.0924) (0.0104)
0.0106* 0.00709** 0.196*** 0.00655GDP per capita
(2014 $ PPP/1000) (0.00542) (0.00265) (0.0552) (0.00597)
0.177** -0.0287 4.173*** 0.555***Constant
(0.0663) (0.0325) (0.577) (0.0655)
Observations 31 31 38 35
R-squared 0.726 0.697 0.721 0.081
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: Authors’ calculations
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Appendix Table A4. Regression results using alternative CPIA specifi cations
[1] [2] [3]
A. Full CPIA sample
































B. SABER sample only
































Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Specifications: (1) using a CPIA threshold value of 2.5 to define the CPIA dummy variable;
(2) using a CPIA threshold of 3.0; (3) using a rescaled CPIA index score. All regressions
include the same control variables. The full CPIA sample consists of all countries with CPIA
data and education outcomes data; the SABER sample is the set of countries that have both
SABER and CPIA data as well as education outcomes data. The rescaled CPIA index is a
simple transformation of the 6-point scale to a 4-point scale because of extremely small
number of countries at the bottom and top ratings.
Source: Authors’ calculations
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A. CPIA index for system dimensions
0.0488** 0.0164 0.0293 -0.00266Education sector strategy
(SST) (0.0238) (0.0113) (0.226) (0.0247)
0.0165 0.0178 -0.0727 -0.0214Management &
Information system (EMS) (0.0270) (0.0128) (0.229) (0.0251)
-0.0195 0.00389 -0.273 0.0210Student assessment (ASS)
(0.0227) (0.0108) (0.203) (0.0208)
0.0261 -0.00269 0.0746 -0.00651Teachers (TCH)
(0.0349) (0.0166) (0.300) (0.0317)
-0.0118 0.00454 0.143 -0.0309Financing (FCN)
(0.0292) (0.0139) (0.246) (0.0251)
0.0365 0.00914 0.0490 0.00899School management
(SBM) (0.0230) (0.0109) (0.206) (0.0218)
B. CPIA dummy variables for system dimensions
SST >= 4 0.205*** 0.0244 0.0326 0.0584
(0.0631) (0.0325) (0.644) (0.0718)
EMS >=4 -0.0500 0.0316 0.0172 -0.0455
(0.0503) (0.0259) (0.452) (0.0492)
ASS >=4 -0.0645 -0.0127 -0.0660 0.0678
(0.0416) (0.0214) (0.396) (0.0416)
6620.0-371.0-5520.0**2890.04=>HCT
(0.0460) (0.0237) (0.438) (0.0456)
FNC >=4 -0.0241 -0.0269 0.525 -0.0232
(0.0437) (0.0225) (0.422) (0.0438)
27300.02530.0-**2650.0**7790.05=>MBS
(0.0442) (0.0228) (0.434) (0.0447)
07570606snoitavresbO
Note: The variables included in these regressions are per-student education expenditures, GDP per capita, and the
average schooling of the adult population aged 50-54; the full CPIA sample is used. Standard errors in parentheses;
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: Authors’ calculations
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